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1 Introduction
Part 1 of this paper presents an account of degree modifiers that involves granularity
shifting. Various aspects affect the likelihood that a speaker would derive an inference
from statements with a modified adjective to similar statements without the modifier,
as in x is slightly dirty vs. x is dirty, or vice versa. The following sections discuss
some of these aspects, including rules for categorization under adjectives (1.1), the
semantics of degree modifiers like slightly and completely (1.2), the relevance of the
notions of granularity, approximation and level of fit (1.3-1.5), and factors affecting
the choice between upper-bounded and upper-open interpretations (1.6). Part 2
presents two studies that test predictions of the developed account.
1.1 Scale-based categorization rules
Assume a λ -categorial language (Heim & Kratzer 1998) and an analysis of gradable
adjectives G as denoting relations between entities x and degrees d based on a
mapping g of entities to their degree in G. Let s(g) stand for the membership
standard of an adjective G: x is G is true in a context c iff x is G to at least degree
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s(g), i.e. g(x)≥ s(g). In short, G(s(g))(x) in c. For example, x is tall is true iff x’s
height exceeds the contextual height standard.
On scale structure theory (Rotstein & Winter 2004; Kennedy & McNally 2005;
Kennedy 2007; McNally 2011) gradable adjectives are classified by their scale type,
namely as lower-closed (+min), upper-closed (+max), both, or neither. Endpoints,
when they exist, function as standards (Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007).
Thus, adjectives are also classified by their standards, as follows.
(1) a. G is partial iff G’s standard minimally exceeds the scale zero: s(g) >
min(g).
b. G is total iff G’s standard is the maximum on G’s scale: s(g) = max(g).
c. G is relative otherwise.
(1) states that partial adjectives have a minimum standard; for example, one stain
suffices for a shirt to count as dirty, meaning that dirty is a partial adjective. Total
adjectives have a maximum standard; for example, to count as clean a shirt has to
be completely free of dirt, meaning that clean is a total adjective. The standard of
relative adjectives like tall is a midpoint on their scale, which varies with context.
Absolute adjectives (i.e., total and partial ones) typically allow for a wider range
of modifiers than relative ones. They license relative modifiers as in very clean/dirty,
but they co-occur significantly more often than relative adjectives with absolute
modifiers, including minimizers as in slightly dirty, and maximizers as in completely
clean. Minimizers are viewed as referencing scale minima. Their distribution is
thought to be restricted to +min adjectives. Maximizers are viewed as referencing
scale maxima. Their distribution is thought to be restricted to +max adjectives.
(2) a. slightly⇔ λG+minλx .∃d > min(g), G(d)(x).
b. completely⇔ λG+maxλx .∃d = max(G), G(d)(x).
According to this account, absolute modifiers are semantically vacuous. Yet, they
function as cues for an adjective’s scale type and thereby indicate how its standard
is to be set (Syrett & Lidz 2010). Moreover, they function as slack regulators
(Lasersohn 1999) signaling precision level. The level of precision of utterances in
ordinary discourses is not maximal. For example, by default, statements like The
garage is clean may be accepted as “true enough” even when they are actually false,
e.g., there are stains on the garage floor. This is so because they are normally precise
enough for all practical purposes.
According to Lasersohn (1999), precision level is determined by pragmatic
halos. Within context any expression is associated with a pragmatic halo, i.e., a set
of alternative denotations of the same type as its actual denotation which differ only
in some pragmatically ignorable respect. Their use counts as acceptable, even if it
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leads to a strictly speaking false proposition. For instance, the pragmatic halo of
is empty in The theater is empty tonight includes properties that are true of objects
that are a bit less than empty. How much less is determined by context, e.g., by
non-linguistic factors such as the size of the theater (Kennedy & McNally 2005).
1.2 A new analysis of degree modifiers
The slack regulator account of modifiers works well for maximizers, but not for
minimizers. Assume, for example, that slightly signals a high standard of precision.
This implies that normally when we say x is dirty we speak loosely, referring to
objects that are almost dirty but actually clean, while when we say x is slightly
dirty we signal reference to objects that are strictly speaking dirty. This is highly
unintuitive. Thus, assume that slightly signals a low standard of precision. This
implies that normally when we say x is slightly dirty we speak loosely, referring to
objects that are almost dirty but actually clean. This is not intuitive either. Thus, an
account in terms of precision level alone does not do.
Minimizers are better accounted for in terms of granularity. Sassoon (2012)
proposes the following analysis. Adjectives are interpreted relative to a coarse
granularity level g. When using statements such as The car is dirty/clean it is
normally appropriate to ignore almost invisible dirt. By contrast, modified adjectives
are interpreted relative to a fine granularity level gp. While using statements such as
The car is completely clean/slightly dirty, almost invisible dirt specks are rendered
relevant in judging degree of cleanliness. Formally,
(3) ∀g, gp ∈ Dxd, gp is finer-grained than g iff (Lewis 1979; van Rooij 2011)
∃x,y ∈ Dx, ((g(x) = g(y))∧ (gp(x) 6= gp(y)))∧∧
@x,y ∈ Dx, ((gp(x) = gp(y))∧ (g(x) 6= g(y))) .
For example, two glasses filled with an amount of wine differing in but few drops
might be indistinguishable relative to g, but distinguishable relative to gp. A total
adjective like full denotes maximally full entities presupposing coarse granularity g.
By contrast, the maximized total adjective form completely full denotes maximally
full entities, presupposing finer granularity gp. Formally,
(4) a. [Gtotal]g = λx ∈C : g(x) = max(g).
b. [completely G]g = λx ∈C : gp(x) = max(gp), for gp finer than g.
Since gp is finer than g, it follows that gp assigns fewer entities the same degree
(= g ⊃= gp). Thus, (4b) is stronger than (4a).
Similarly, a partial adjective like dirty denotes minimally dirty entities, presup-
posing coarse granularity g. Thus, objects covered with a few specks of dirt are
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considered to be as clean as objects which are completely free of dirt. By contrast,
the minimized partial adjective form slightly dirty denotes minimally dirty entities,
presupposing finer granularity gp. Formally,
(5) a. [Gpartial]g = λx ∈C : g(x)> min(g).
b. [slightly G]g = λx ∈C : gp(x)> min(gp), for gp finer than g.
Since gp is finer than g, more distinctions are made, i.e., gp assigns more entities
different degrees > g ⊂> gp). Thus, (5b) is weaker than (5a).
On this account, the distribution of modifiers is not sensitive to scales with
endpoints, but to classification rules based on identity to a degree as in (4a) vs. an
external threshold as in (5a). Thus, definition (5b) can be replaced with (6).
(6) [slightly G]g = λx ∈ C : gp(x) > ds, for gp finer than g :> g ⊂> gp, where
ds represents a threshold external to the denotation, but not necessarily the
scale zero.
This account captures the use of slightly with relative and total adjectives. In
relative adjectives slightly is licensed only if an external threshold is made salient,
for instance due to excessive- or for-phrase modification, as in slightly too tall and
slightly tall for her age. With total adjectives, slightly triggers minimal shifting to a
non-maximal standard, ds < max(gp), which can therefore function as an external
threshold for denotation members to exceed. Hence, slightly full implies rather full.
The predictions of this analysis differ from those of the scale structure analysis
in (2). The standard shifting involved in modification of total adjectives according to
this analysis renders combinations of slightly with total adjectives less compatible
than combinations with partial adjectives. Indeed, felicity judgments and corpus
frequencies of slightly support sensitivity to standard types (partialtotal) rather
than mere existence vs. absence of scale minimum (Sassoon 2012).
In addition, according to scale structure theory, statements with minimized total
adjectives do not entail the same statements without the minimizer, e.g., ¬(The city
square is slightly full ⇒ The city square is full). The former only requires that
the argument’s degree minimally exceed the scale zero, while the latter requires it
to reach the scale maximum. However, intuitively, The city square is slightly full
conveys something equivalent to ‘the city square is rather full/more full than empty’.
This is unexpected given a semantics for slightly full that merely requires that the
degree of instances exceed the zero on full’s scale. Instead, the extension of slightly
full seems to cover degrees above a threshold ds slightly below the maximum.
Rotstein & Winter (2004) argue that the status of absolute scale minima and
maxima as standards of absolute adjectives is based on a default rule which may be
overridden in context. However, Rotstein & Winter (2004) do not specify in what
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ways contexts affect the selection of standard. McNally (2011) completely abandons
the notion of endpoints, arguing that, e.g., total predicates may pick out regions on
a scale that are not actual maxima as in This wine glass is full. When ordering a
glass of wine in a restaurant, one cannot demand one’s money back if served a glass
filled up to half of its capacity. This suggests that a convention exists for a standard
located away from the maximum of a fine scale.
We propose that granularity is a crucial factor in accounting for these facts.
In most ordinary discourse contexts, scales of coarse granularity are employed.
Therefore, even endpoint standards, as they are based on coarse scales, cover more
than the absolute endpoints of fine-grained scales.1
In sum, a theory of modifiers that includes granularity levels and granularity
shifting improves on one that abstracts away from these parameters in that it extends
to minimizers. It reveals a semantic core that degree modifiers share.
Another advantage is that a granularity shifting theory applies in other domains
of grammar, too. For example, Krifka (2002, 2007) observed a coupling between
(non-)round numbers and (non-)round interpretations, and argued more generally
that simple expressions align with imprecise interpretations based on coarse scales,
while complex or long expressions align with precise interpretations based on fine
scales. Viewed in this light, adjectives and their modified forms are merely subcases
of simple vs. complex expressions and are therefore expected to trigger the use of
different default levels of granularity.
Thus, the next section is aimed at presenting a formal account of granularity,
precision, and their effects on the interpretation of numerals, as developed in Krifka
2007, and a detailed comparison with adjectives and their modifiers.
1.3 Granularity and approximation in numerals vs. adjectives
When we count, we map pluralities of individuals into numbers representing their
cardinalities. This mapping depends on the contextual setting of a granularity param-
eter, namely the selection of a set of alternative numerals. A set-inclusion relation
between alternative sets affects the derivation of vague vs. precise interpretations.
(7) a. ... one hundred, two hundred, three hundred, ...
b. ... ninety, one hundred, one hundred and ten, one hundred and twenty ...
For example, the alternative set in (7a) triggers interpretations relative to a coarse
scale, whereas the set in (7b) triggers interpretations relative to a finer scale. In
addition, the average complexity of expressions as measured by, for example, number
1 McNally (2011) suggests that standards tend to be based on factors such as proportionality, perceptual
salience, and purposes. Probably these factors affect the choice of granularity level as well.
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of syllables, is greater in alternative sets corresponding to finer scales, e.g., in (7b)
as compared to (7a).
Krifka (2007) derives the facts concerning the most likely interpretation of an
ambiguous or vague form such as that of numerals by using the principles of strategic
communication (Parikh 2000; Benz, Jäger & van Rooij 2006), as follows. First, it is
hypothesized that addressees assume the speaker intends the most likely interpreta-
tion and speakers assume the addressees select the most likely interpretation, given
the choice of expressions and a priori likelihood of a message.
Second, to adopt this framework, approximate interpretations of a numeral n
are represented via an interval [n−n/s, n+n/s] interpreted as a normal distribution
with mean n (the precise interpretation) and standard deviation s (the level of approx-
imation). The range within n/s above and below the central tendency is used as an
acceptable level of fit, corresponding to a pragmatic halo in (Lasersohn 1999). With
a smaller 1/s, the interpretation gets more precise. At a level of approximation of,
e.g., 1/10, ten stands for the interval [ten]/ = [, ]. At a level of approximation
of 1/∞(≈ 0), ten is interpreted in a precise way: [ten] = {}, see (Dehaene 1997).
Third, Krifka (2002, 2007) assumes a maxim of brevity whereby alternative
sets with shorter expressions are preferred. Hence, the use of an expression α is
assumed to introduce the most coarse-grained alternative set possible for it into
the pragmatic evaluation. Expressions with similar interpretations like thirty eight
and forty given s = 10 are assumed to be interpretatively equivalent, because their
precise values, 38 and 40, are within each other’s ranges: [forty]/ = ± and
[thirty-eight]/ = ±..
By virtue of being wider, approximate interpretations are more probable than
precise ones. Assume equal a priori probabilities pv of scale values, as well as equal
a priori probabilities pa of approximation levels. The probability of the precise
interpretation (s = 0) is p([forty]) = pv, and that of the approximate interpretation
(s = 1/10) is p([forty]/) = p([, ]) = pv. The total probability p(1/10) ·
p([ f orty]/) = pv pa is bigger than the total probability p(0) · p([forty]) = pv pa.
Thus, the approximate interpretation of forty is more probable. The same holds
for thirty eight, but the latter is more complex than the interpretatively equivalent
forty. Hence, by brevity, it cannot be used to refer to the preferred approximate
interpretation. Thus, by default it is associated with a more precise interpretation.
Finally, assuming equal a priori probabilities ps for scales, resort to coarser ones
is more probable. For example, forty minutes invokes the more coarse-grained scale
(9a) rather than the fine-grained scale (9b), as its approximate interpretation in the
former is wider and therefore more probable (8):
(8) p([40]a) = p([, ]) = pv > p([]b) = p([., .]) = pv.
(9) a. ...-30—————————-40—————————-50-...
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b. ...-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-...
Like numerals, (un)modified adjectives create alternative sets, too.
(10) a. clean, dirty.
b. completely clean, very clean, clean, pretty clean, slightly clean,
slightly dirty, pretty dirty, dirty, very dirty, completely dirty.
We hypothesize in analogy with numerals that adjectives and their modifiers
are associated with a probability distribution over the scale ranges they denote,
representing level of fit of reference to each scale point. Peaks represent typical
contexts of use. For example, the denotation of clean overlaps with (is a superset
of) that of completely clean. Yet, we typically use clean to refer to lower degrees
than completely clean the peak of which is located at the maximum. The denotation
of slightly dirty overlaps with (is a superset of) that of dirty. Yet, we typically use
only the latter to refer to high degrees. Moreover, the sum of scale ranges covered
by modified adjectives (e.g., slightly dirty, pretty dirty) on a fine scale aligns to the
scale range covered by the adjective they modify (e.g., dirty) on a coarser scale.
Assume that the precise interpretation of the nth member in an alternative set
is the nth point on the scale, and its approximate interpretation per threshold s is
n±n/s. Suppose f n : Dx→{, . . . , } is a function from entities to degrees on a
scale like [1, 2, 3, . . . , 10]. For the alternative set (10b):
(11) a. f ,s=(dirty) = ; f ,s=(dirty) = [±/] = [, . . . , ].
b. f ,s=(slightly dirty) = ; f ,s=(slightly dirty) = [±/] = [, . . . , ]
This means that this approximate interpretation of dirty partially overlaps with
that of slightly dirty. Similarly, the interpretations of slightly dirty and slightly clean
overlap, etc.
Approximate interpretations are more probable than precise ones. Assuming
equal a priori probabilities pv for scale values and pa for approximation levels, the
precise interpretation of clean per (10b), is f ,s=(clean) = , with total probability
p(0) · p([clean]) = pa pv. The total probability of the approximate interpretation
for, e.g., s = 3, is greater: p(3) · p[clean]/ = pv pa, so clean is interpreted approx-
imately.
Furthermore, interpretations relative to coarse scales are more probable than
fine ones. For example, assuming equal scale probabilities ps, on the coarse scale
(10a), the widest range of dirty is [dirty]c = [, ], whereas on the fine scale (10b),
the widest range is [dirty] f = [., .). Thus, the probability of the coarse scale,
p([dirty]c) = pv ps, is bigger than the probability of the fine scale, p([dirty] f ) =
pv ps. Therefore, dirty invokes a coarse scale rather than a fine one. By contrast,
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Figure 1 The coarse and fine interpretation of partial adjectives like dirty.
completely dirty does not denote any scale point on the coarse scale, so it cannot be
interpreted at this level. The first scale it can be interpreted at is a fine one, where its
default precise interpretation captures points in [9.5, 10]. Thus, this analysis predicts
that dirty is interpreted in a less precise way than completely dirty.
With these results at hand, we can now turn to modifying our assumptions
regarding adjectives by incorporating insights from scale structure theory (Kennedy
& McNally 2005; Rotstein & Winter 2004; Kennedy 2007) and so acknowledge
differences between numerals and adjectives.
First, an adjective like dirty is associated with a mapping of entities to degrees
representing amount of dirt, while clean is associated with a converse function.
Moreover, unlike numerals, the precise interpretation of (modified) adjectives is
often a scale range rather than a point, and they appear to denote monotonic scalar
functions (Heim 2000); for example, the range denoted by very+A includes besides
its most probable value, also the range denoted by completely+A. Therefore, the
interpretation of the nth expression in an adjectival alternative set is better described
by means of an interval [min, n] or [n, max], where min/max are either scale ends or
infinity (see also sections 1.1-1.2).
Second, the size of the scale ranges denoted by antonyms or by their modified
forms are not all equal. Unlike numerals, the precise interpretation of partial adjec-
tives like dirty on a coarse scale covers a wide range as their semantics is based on
a minimum-standard rule (cf. section 1.1). It is even wider on a fine scale, where
it is identical to the interpretation of slightly dirty (cf. section 1.2). The precise
interpretation of total adjectives like clean is based on a maximum-standard rule
and so on a fine scale it equals that of completely clean, and might be extended
further down only under a non-zero level of approximation (Kennedy 2007). Thus,
upon shifting to a finer granularity, the interpretation of clean shrinks, as hardly
visible dust grains become relevant. Such narrowing is prevalent in numerals upon
a shift to a finer granularity level. Note, however, that the excluded bits move into
the interpretation of dirty, which thereby widens, as figure (1) illustrates. Widening
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upon a shift to finer granularity never occurs in numerals.
Hence, the precise interpretations of partial adjectives on coarse scales are
narrower than on fine ones. Thus, in order not to wrongly predict that they tend to be
interpreted on fine scales, we have to assume that their approximate interpretations
on coarse scales are at least as wide as on fine scale. A reason for that can be that
precise partial denotations on fine scales are too large to be widened, whereas on
coarse scales they can be widened. With this auxiliary assumption, Krifka’s theory
captures the facts. Since approximate interpretations are larger they are still the
preferred choice for unmodified adjectives, and so is the coarse scale.
The situation is different with modified adjectives, which only denote on fine
scales, and, by brevity, their precise interpretations are preferred. Therefore, bare
adjectives are predictably interpreted more coarsely than modified ones.
Finally, intuitively, the higher the degree of an entity in an adjective, the higher its
level of fit as an argument of the adjective. Thus, the best level of fit of an adjective
typically includes extreme points (the very/completely range) on coarse scales. Only
upon a shift to finer scales, the peak is intuitively located lower, namely between the
ranges of pretty and very. The next section supports these claims.
1.4 Level of fit
On a scale structure + slack regulator account of imprecise uses of total adjectives
like clean (see section 1.1), reference to the maximum of the finest scale has the
highest level of fit. The level of fit reduces as the distance increases between an
argument’s degree and the maximum. Moreover, any level of fit other than the highest
is considered imprecise. A difficulty to extend this account to capture modification of
partial adjectives as in slightly dirty emerges in part because the precise interpretation
of partial adjectives like dirty consists of almost the whole scale range. It is therefore
more difficult to characterize loose use of dirty. We propose that the notion of level
of fit does extend to cover also these cases, as follows.
Scale structure theory predicts that statements with partial adjectives do not
entail their maximized versions: ¬(The city square is dirty⇒ The city square is
completely dirty). However, intuitively, the adjective dirty has a higher level of fit
when applied to an argument denoting a very dirty or even completely dirty entity
than to an argument denoting an entity covered by few hardly visible dirt specks. In
other words, upon hearing dirty we typically have in mind something dirtier than just
slightly dirty things. Thus, people might agree that by default The city square is dirty
conveys the content of The city square is completely dirty or some other proposition
slightly weaker, but still significantly stronger than just ‘the city square is covered
by a slight amount of dirt’. This is unexpected given a mere “more than zero dirt”
categorization rule for dirty. It supports a representation of level of fit with a high
234
Granularity shifting: Experimental evidence from degree modifiers
peak away from the beginning of the scale range depicted by a minimum-standard
categorization rule.
Similarly, in scale structure theory, statements like The table is dirty and The
table is slightly dirty are predicted to be equivalent. However, there is an intuitive
difference between them, which is captured by the assumption that in total and partial
adjectives alike, the highest level of fit lies far above that of minimized total/partial
adjectives. A theory of scale structure combined with a granularity (cf. section 1.3)
can capture these effects of level of fit on judgments of inferences. Assuming that
peaks of antonyms are near opposite scale endpoints, even partial adjectives like
dirty are predicted to typically refer to rather/completely dirty points, not to slightly
dirty ones.
This prediction aligns with experimental evidence (Paradis & Willners 2006). In
this study, participants had to grade arguments of adjectives in Swedish on an 11-
point scale. Thus, for example, arguments of the total adjective dead and its negation
not dead were associated with points 1 and 6, respectively, whereas arguments of the
partial antonym alive and its negation not alive were associated with points 8 and
slightly above 1, respectively. In sum, the scale range denoted by the total adjective
appears to be narrower than that of the partial one, as scale structure theory predicts.
The former consists of at most 5 points (1—5), while the latter might consist of up
to 10 points (2—11). However, the default level of fit of the partial adjective appears
to be the high degree 8, not 2.2
In sum, intuitively, adjectives have significantly higher peaks, especially on
coarse scales, than minimized ones have on fine scales. As a result, inferences
between, e.g., dirty/clean and completely dirty/clean should be easier than infer-
ences between dirty/clean and slightly dirty/clean. Generally, we expect inferences
between statements with and without a maximizer to be stronger than inferences
between statements with and without a minimizer: “If maximized A, then A” “If
minimized A then A” (Prediction 1).3
2 Moreover, Anderson (1996) tested the hypothesis that modifiers have fixed locations on a quan-
tity scale, providing evidence for our assumptions concerning the locations of peaks of modified
adjectives. For example, judgments of how likable a person is described by an adjective like sin-
cere/insincere form a linear increasing/decreasing curve with slightly at the most extreme point,
followed by somewhat, fairly/rather, pretty, quite/very, and extremely. An unmodified adjective is
located in between pretty and quite/very (Anderson 1996: 398-404).
3 In line with this view, note also that maximizers express agreement with a previously uttered bare
adjective (e.g., My shirt is dry/wet − Yes/??No, it’s completely dry/wet), while minimizers serve as
polite markers of disagreement (e.g., My shirt is dry/wet − Yes/No, it’s slightly dry/wet). Similarly,
an adjective following its maximized form hardly expresses discontent (e.g., My shirt is completely
dry/wet − Yes/??No, it’s dry/wet), while a bare adjective following its minimized form conveys
disagreement with the use of the hedge (e.g., My shirt is slightly wet/dry − Yes/No, it’s dry/wet).
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Figure 2 Level of fit in adjectives P and their antonyms.
1.5 Licensed and unlicensed granularity shifts in discourse
Lewis (1979) argues that a shift from default to finer granularity and/or precision level
is a natural discourse move, but not vice versa. We may state that the Netherlands is
flat, presupposing coarse granularity, and then point out that it is actually a bit bumpy
by shifting to a finer criterion, taking as evidence bumps we previously ignored.
However, we cannot state that the Netherlands is bumpy and smoothly proceed to
say that it is actually flat, thereby ignoring bumps we previously regarded relevant.
Thus, once an expression of a fine alternative set is uttered like slightly dirty, the
interpretation of an expression like dirty is forced to be relativized to a fine scale.
Two studies of inferences with modified and bare adjectives provide experimental
evidence for the granularity shifting account of degree modifiers presented above.
Following Lewis, we hypothesize that inferences from modified to unmodified
adjectives are easier to agree with than ones from unmodified to modified adjectives,
because the former involve an irreversible shift to finer granularity due to which the
interpretation of an adjective is rendered similar to that of a modified one. Study
1 tests this hypothesis for combinations of minimizers with partial adjectives and
maximizers with total adjectives: “If M A then A” “If A then M A” (Prediction
2).
The question whether this pattern holds for maximized partial adjectives and
minimized total adjectives was tested in study 2. However, since the interpretation
of total adjectives remains different from the interpretation of their minimized
forms even when interpreted precisely following an irreversible granularity shift,
we predicted positive answers to “If M A then A” and “If A then M A” except for
combinations with minimizers and total adjectives (Prediction 3a) and “if minimized
partial A then A” “if minimized total A then A” (Prediction 3b).
Before we proceed to describe the studies, the next section discusses shortly the
notions of alternative sets and level of fit in relation to upper-bounded vs. upper-open
interpretations in numerals vs. adjectives.
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1.6 Upper-bounded vs. Upper-open readings
Recently it has been convincingly demonstrated (Breheny 2005; Geurts 2009) that
numerals have upper-bounded interpretations (e.g., five means ‘exactly five’). In
contrast, experimental evidence suggests that upper-bounded readings of bare adjec-
tives, such as a reading of cool as ‘not cold’, are rarer than upper-bounded readings
of numerals, quantifiers (some as ‘not all’), and modals (probably as ‘not definitely’)
(Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson & Ward 2009; Zevakhina & Geurts 2011).
In the inference task in the study of Zevakhina & Geurts (2011), participants
rarely admitted yes responses to texts like John says: The sand was warm. Would
you infer from this that, according to John, the sand was not hot?. Thus, they did not
derive upper-bounded readings for adjectives. An additional task, where participants
had to list 3 alternatives for an adjective in a sentence such as The sand is warm,
showed that an increased degree of availability of an alternative set increases the
probability of an upper-bounded interpretation.
The verification study in Doran et al. (2009) also demonstrated that setting an
adjective within an alternative set increases the probability of an upper-bounded
interpretation. Given the fact Jeremy can’t fit in an airplane seat, the multi-condition
question In terms of size would you say that Jeremy is average, big or huge?
significantly increased the likelihood of a scalar implicature compared to the none
condition What size is Jeremy? and the one condition In terms of size would you say
that Jeremy is huge?.
In sum, adjectives tend to be interpreted along coarse-grained scales, with high
approximation levels, therefore their denotation range is extended, possibly up to
the high end of the scale (an upper-open interpretation). However, contexts in
which richer alternative sets are salient trigger interpretations along finer scales, with
increased probability of upper-bounded interpretations. In addition, an overall low
rate of upper-bounded readings with unmodified total or partial adjectives might be
due to an effect of level of fit, namely due to the fact that entities with high degrees
have the highest level of fit even in adjectives with low standards of membership.4
The studies described above did not test semantic relations and inferences in
statements with modified adjectives. We predict that in these cases too upper-
bounded readings will be rare since the alternative set is vague. No fixed set of
lexical items and modifiers is salient outside context. Evidence that, e.g., the
modified adjective slightly dirty has an ‘at least slightly dirty and possibly dirty’
reading comes from the fact that the typical intonation contour of utterances such
as The floor is not slightly dirty, it is very dirty is characteristic of metalinguistic
negation. This suggests that the logical negation of a minimized adjective cannot be
used to refer to high degrees, as these are part of the minimized adjective denotation
4 In that, the role of level of fit resembles the role of typicality in van Tiel (2012).
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(e.g., slightly dirty)5,6.
2 Experimenting with modified and unmodified adjectives
2.1 Study 1: Granularity shifting
2.1.1 Methods
Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Every hit was
answered by 25 participants. All in all, 295 participants answered an average of 17
questions per participant (SD = 34). The lexical items consisted of 34 adjectives
divided to by their standard type, with 17 partial adjectives (dirty, sick, wet, bent,
open, transparent, difficult, longer, awake, visible, dangerous, worried, bumpy,
inaccurate, impure, needed, uncertain) and 17 total adjectives (clean, healthy, dry,
straight, closed, opaque, full, empty, asleep, invisible, safe, unworried, flat, accurate,
pure, unneeded, certain), arbitrarily chosen from a pool of widely accepted standard-
based typologies (Rotstein & Winter 2004; Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy
2007).
Each adjective A occurred in 6 versions of a text involving a modifier M, slightly,
somewhat, or a bit for the partial adjectives, and completely, entirely, or perfectly
for the total ones. The texts consisted of an agreement task with either a coarse-fine
inference (“Nick thinks that x is A. Nick’s mother thinks that x is M A. Would Nick
agree that x is M A?”), or a fine-coarse inference (“Nick thinks that x is M A. Nick’s
mother thinks that x is A. Would Nick agree that x is A?”). The fillers consisted of
similar texts, except that instead of “x is A” and “x is M A” they included statements
such as “x is more A1 and A2” and either “x is more A2”, or “x is less A2”. Half of
the fillers were likely to be answered positively and half negatively.
This design resulted in 204 target sentences (3 modifiers × 34 adjectives × 2
inferences), and 272 fillers. The filler and target texts were counterbalanced into 34
lists of 14 texts each, including 8 fillers and 6 targets. Participants were asked to
provide an answer on a scale ranging from 1 (certainly not) to 5 (certainly yes). The
predictions are listed in sections 1.4-1.5.
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SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY A BIT Total
If A, M A 4.09 (.29) 3.89 (.23) 4.07 (.28) 4.01 (.28)
If M A, A 4.29 (0.2) 4.22 (0.23) 4.33 (0.16) 4.28 (.20)
Total 4.19 (0.27) 4.05 (0.28) 4.2 (0.26) 4.14 (.28)
ENTIRELY COMPLETELY PERFECTLY Total
If A, M A 4.22 (.19) 4.28 (.25) 4.22 (.18) 4.24 (.21)
If M A, A 4.85 (0.09) 4.85 (0.08) 4.8 (0.16) 4.83 (.11)
Total 4.54 (.35) 4.56 (0.34) 4.51 (0.34) 4.54 (.34)
Table 1 Averaged agreement ratings plus standard deviations for experiment 1.
2.1.2 Results and discussion
Table 1 and figure 3 present the averages over 17 target items per condition of the
averages over 25 participants per item. The 136 positive and 136 negative fillers had
averaged ratings of 4.85 (.12) and 1.29 (.22), respectively. Thus, all the averaged
scores of the target items fall within the positive range (points 3.8-5). This suggests
that the range denoted by maximizers and minimizers alike begins at the denotation
minimum (not scale minimum). It also shows that upper-bounded readings are
relatively minor (in the given types of context). For example, in the given texts,
slightly dirty is not interpreted as ‘at most slight amount of dirt’ (dirty only given
fine granularity: [dirty]gp and [¬dirty]g), and clean is not interpreted as ‘at most
clean’ (clean only given coarse granularity: [clean]g and [¬clean]gp).
A 2-way factorial ANOVA for 2 samples (partial adjectives + minimizers and
total adjectives + maximizers), with 2 repeated measures (inference forms “If A,
M A” and “If M A, A”) yields a significant effect for adjective + modifier type
(F(1,50) = 155.6, p < .0001), and inference type (F(1,50) = 312.67, p < .0001),
along predictions 1 and 2, and also a significant interaction (F(1,50) = 45.33,
p < .0001). The interaction value is due to the fact that the difference between
inference types is more pronounced with the maximizers than with the minimizers,
and the effect of adjective + modifier is more pronounced with the inference pattern
“If M A, A” (M=4.56, SD=3.2) than with “If A, M A” (M=4.13, SD=.27).
Thus, prediction 2 of the granularity shifting account is borne out by these
findings. The pattern “If A, M A” involves moving from coarse to fine granularity.
5 Moreover, negating minimized adjectives, as in ?not slightly dirty, is a bit odd, except in the presence
of a marker of unexpectedness, as in not even slightly dirty, which is perfectly felicitous. The reason
is arguably that minimized adjectives refer to a wider range than non-minimized ones. It is especially
unlikely for an entity to fall outside this wide range.
6 Notice, however, that our studies only test for inferences between statements of the form “x thinks
that y is A/ M A” and “x agrees that y is M A / A”, where A is an adjective, and M a modifier.
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Figure 3 Averaged agreement ratings for experiment 1.
Speakers directly infer from an utterance of The floor is dirty the entailment that the
floor is slightly dirty. However, since the floor could be dirtier than a floor that Nick
would typically call slightly dirty, the answers for the inference pattern “If A, M A”
are only weakly positive, because there is room for doubt; a “certainly yes” answer
would suggest that Nick uses the words in an atypical way.
By contrast, in the pattern “If M A, A”, since shifting back from fine to coarse
granularity is not acceptable, slightly triggers an irreversible shift to finer granularity.
Hence, in support of Lewis (1979), dirty, affected by the shift, is interpreted on a
fine-grained scale, as equivalent to its minimized form. So speakers infer from The
floor is slightly dirty that the floor is dirty with greater certainty than vice versa, i.e.
the answers for “If M A, A” are significantly more positive than for “If A, M A”.
Similar reasoning holds for, e.g., clean and completely clean.
As the tests above show, the results for total adjectives + maximizers (M = 4.54,
SD = .34) are significantly more positive than for partial adjectives + minimizers
(M = 4.15, SD = .28). This suggests that the default interpretation of unmodified
total adjectives is closer to that of their modified form than the default interpretation
of unmodified partial adjectives is close to that of their modified form. However, the
design of this experiment makes it impossible to say whether this effect is due to
modifier type (prediction 1) or adjective type. Study 2 aims to answer this question.7
7 The results of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests further show that all of the maximizers behave alike, while
the minimizer slightly is distinguished from the other minimizers, mainly with respect to the pattern
“If A, M A” where it induces the least positive results.
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If A, completely A If A, slightly A If completely A, A If slightly A, A
Total 6.03 (.35) 4.52 (.37) 6.73 (.19) 4.69 (.38)
Partial 5.62 (.30) 5.09 (.21) 6.72 (.18) 5.70 (.37)
Relative 5.58 (.34) 5.25 (.46) 6.75 (.08) 5.44 (.48)
TOTAL 5.77 (.38) 4.89 (.45) 6.73 (.16) 5.24 (.61)
Table 2 Averaged agreement ratings plus standard deviations for experiment 2.
2.2 Study 2: Level of fit and modifier vs. adjective type effects
2.2.1 Methods
Participants were recruited using AMT. All in all, 161 participants answered on
average 19 questions per participant (SD = 29). The lexical items consisted of 30
different adjectives divided to 5 types by their standard and scale type: total doubly-
closed (full, closed, empty, invisible, correct, opaque), total upper-closed (clean,
healthy, dry, straight, safe, flat), partial doubly-closed (open, transparent, visible,
wrong, incorrect, unclear), partial lower-closed (dirty, sick, wet, bent, dangerous,
bumpy), and relative (long, short, big, small, happy, sad), arbitrarily chosen from a
pool of widely accepted standard- and scale-based typologies (Rotstein & Winter
2004; Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007).
Each adjective occurred in 4 versions of a text involving either the modifier
slightly or the modifier completely, and the same inference patterns as in study 1.
This design resulted in 120 target texts (5 adjective types × 6 items × 2 modifiers
× 2 inference types). The fillers were target items of other experiments, consisting
of the same texts as the targets, except that instead of statements of the form “x
is (M) A”, 120 fillers involved statements with round vs. precise numerals (as in
“x has nine/ten shirts”), and 136 fillers involved statements with adjectives in the
comparative form (“x is more attentive/caring than y”). The participants were asked
to provide an answer on a scale ranging from 1 (certainly not) to 7 (certainly yes).
2.2.2 Results and discussion
Based on the averages over 25 participants per text, table 2 and figure 4 present
the averages over texts with partial, total and relative adjectives. The results of
experiment 1 were replicated. A 2-way factorial ANOVA for 3 blocks (12 total,
12 partial, and 6 relative adjectives) and 4 repeated measures (2 inference types
with slightly vs. completely), yields a significant difference between inference
types (F(3,29) = 192, p < .0001), and between adjective types (F(2,29) = 11.4,
p < .0003), as well as a significant interaction (F(6,29) = 13.8, p < .0001).
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Figure 4 Averaged agreement ratings for experiment 2.
Regarding inference type, a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test yields that ranking
of agreement is generally significantly higher for “If M A, A” than for “If A, M
A” (W = −866, ns/r = , z = −5.23, p < .0001), and this is also the case for
completely (W = 465, ns/r = , z = 4.78, p < .0001), and slightly (W = 330,
ns/r = , z = 3.39, p < .0007) considered separately. As in study 1, this supports
the hypothesized facilitation of inference from modified to unmodified adjectives
(fine to coarse interpretations) than vice versa (prediction 2).
Regarding modifier type, a Wilcoxon test yields that ranking of agreement is
generally significantly higher for completely than for slightly (W = 1790, ns/r = ,
z = 6.59, p < .0001), and this is the case for “If M A, A” (W = 465, ns/r = ,
z= 4.78, p < .0001) and for “If A, M A” (W = 425, ns/r = , z= 4.37, p < .0001).
Thus, inferences are easier with maximizers than minimizers, even when maximized
partial adjectives and minimized total ones are considered (prediction 1).
Furthermore, a 2-way factorial ANOVA for 2 repeated measures (inference type:
“If slightly A, A” vs. “If A, slightly A”), yields a significant difference between
inference types (F(1,29) = 20.67, p < .0002), and adjective types (F(2,29) =
23.83, p < .0001), and a significant interaction (F(2,29) = 3.78, p < .04). The
interaction is due to the fact that the difference between inference types is not
significant in inferences with slightly and total adjectives. In addition, certainty is
lower with minimized total than relative or partial adjectives. Thus, predictions 3a-b
are borne out.
Agreement was predicted to be higher with partial adjectives than total ones, due
to the fact that the interpretation of minimized total adjectives differs from the fine
and precise interpretation of unmodified total adjectives. The former is based on
shifting of the standard to a degree lower than the maximum and its best level of fit
is at that lower point. Thus, it is not even included in the maximum (the denotation
of the unmodified total adjective, as illustrated in figure 5).8
8 A 2-way factorial ANOVA for 2 repeated measures (inference type: “If completely A, A” vs. “If
A, completely A”), yields a significant difference between inference types (F(1,29) = 195.29, p <
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Figure 5 The coarse and fine interpretation of total adjectives like full.
As for more fine-grained distinctions, significant differences were found be-
tween adjectives differing in their standard type, but not scale type. Doubly-closed
partial and doubly-closed total adjectives differ significantly in the patterns “If A,
completely A” (Mp = ., Mt = .; U = 31, z = −2, p < .05), “If slightly A, A”
(Mp = ., Mt = ., U = 32.5, z= 2.24, p < .03), and “If slightly A, A” (Mp = .,
Mt = ., U = 34.5, z = 2.56, p < .011). Two additional differences were found
between adjectives differing in their scale type but not standard type. Considering
the inference “If A, completely A”, a Mann-Whitney test yields significantly more
positive average responses for doubly-closed total adjectives (n = 6, M = 8.6) than
only upper-closed total ones (n = 6, M = 4.4; U = 5.5, z = 1.92, p < .055). By
contrast, considering the inference “If slightly A, A”, a Mann-Whitney test yields
significantly more positive average responses for only lower-closed partial adjectives
(n = 6, M = 8.5) than doubly-closed partial ones (n = 6, M = 4.5; U = 6, z = 1.84,
p < .07).
To summarize, according to the granularity shifting account, adjectival modifi-
cation triggers a granularity shift, rendering relevant, e.g., hardly visible dirt specks
that are by default ignorable in judging cleanliness. This analysis correctly predicted
lower agreement rates in coarse to fine patterns than in fine to coarse patterns (“If M
A then A” “If A then M A”). This effect was predictably absent in total adjectives
modified by slightly. The reason is that the precise interpretation of, e.g., full is
different from that of slightly full. The fine and precise interpretation of full, [full]gp,
consists of maximally full entities, where any tiny amount of content missing (e.g.
.0001), and adjective types (F(2,29) = 4.57, p < .02), and a significant interaction (F(2,29) = 4.71,
p < .02), mainly due to a higher certainty in total than relative or partial adjectives concerning the
inference “If A, completely A”, but equal certainty concerning “If completely A, A”, in line with
scale structure theory.
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two drops in a glass) render an object non-maximally full. By contrast, in addition to
triggering a shift to gp, slightly also triggers a standard shift such that a non-maximal
external threshold is set for denotation members to exceed. This means that slightly
full does not entail full, although it implies rather full or fuller (it doesn’t entail not
full either).
3 Conclusions: Toward a general theory of granularity
The results of the studies presented support the hypotheses based on Lewis’s con-
straints on granularity shifting (1979), and an extension to adjectives of Krifka’s
representation of granularity in numerals (2007), modulo semantic differences be-
tween adjectives and numerals. This supports the view that general principles govern
the setting of a granularity level and its shifting within discourse, principles which
apply in different domains of grammar, including round and complex numerals and
unmodified and modified adjectives.
A crucial difference between numerals and adjectives is that on fine interpre-
tations different numerals denote different points, while modified and unmodified
adjectives often denote highly overlapping intervals. This fact might be connected
with the fact that upper-bounded readings are minor in adjectives (Doran et al. 2009).
Future work should address this issue, as well as the connections between level of fit
and scalar implicatures, and their respective role in explaining inference data.9
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